The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) on July 15 imposed sanctions on seven individuals and entities involved in an international network supporting weapons procurement on behalf of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) . The action follows Iranian attacks on commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and builds on previous designations from May and June 2026 that targeted networks sourcing weapons, including man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS), for the IRGC .
“President Trump has been clear that Iran must denuclearize,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent in a statement . “Treasury will continue to target and disrupt the illicit procurement networks that fund Iran’s weapons programs and war machine.”
The designations target Russian nationals Mariya Vladimirovna Selina and Vadim Anatolyevich Druzhbin, both employees of Avratek OOO, a Moscow-based aviation transportation company also sanctioned in the action . According to OFAC, Selina is the head of the financial department at Avratek and “has supported Namazi’s procurement efforts on behalf of the IRGC” . Druzhbin, also an Avratek employee, “has coordinated travel for Namazi and Selina” and “has previously been involved in coordinating Iranian shipments” .
The IRGC Procurement Network
At the center of the network is Iranian national Behrouz Namazi, identified by OFAC as the general director of Nika Jet Company, a Tehran-based provider of services for the production, distribution, and maintenance of aircraft parts and drones . Namazi, according to the Treasury, “has sought to secure weapons on behalf of the IRGC” .
The network’s international reach extends beyond Russia and Iran:
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Vanguard Tactical Supply Limited (Nigeria) – An intermediary for Namazi’s procurement efforts .
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Dounia Ettaib (Italy) – A Milan-based Italian national identified as “a witting participant in efforts to procure weapons for Namazi” .
OFAC highlighted that “the actors designated today exemplify Iran’s use of foreign aviation and transport firms, financial conduits, and travel coordinators to obscure the IRGC’s role in illicit procurement and to move material and personnel globally” .
Sanctions Implications: SDN List and Secondary Sanctions
As a result of the July 15 action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC.
